Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787
by James Madison
Tuesday, September 4
In Convention, — Mr. BREARLY, from the Committee of eleven, made a further partial Report as follows:
“The Committee of eleven, to whom sundry resolutions, &c., were referred on the thirty-first of August, report, that in their opinion the following additions and alterations should be made to the Report before the Convention, viz:1
“1. The first clause of Article 7, Section 1, to read as follows: ‘The Legislature shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.’
“2. At the end of the second clause of Article 7, Section 1, add, ‘and with the Indian tribes.’
“3. In the place of the 9th Article, Section 1, to be inserted: ‘The Senate of the United States shall have power to try all impeachments; but no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.’
“4. After the word ‘Excellency,’ in Section 1, Article 10, to be inserted: ‘He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and together with the Vice President chosen for the same term, be elected in the following manner, viz: Each State shall appoint, in such manner as its Legislature may direct, a number of Electors equal to the whole number of Senators and members of the House of Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Legislature. The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; and they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each, which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit, sealed, to the seat of the General Government, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in that House, open all the certificates, and the votes shall be then and there counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of that of the Electors; and if there be more than one who have such a majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the Senate shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for President; but if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list the Senate shall choose by ballot the President; and in every case after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes shall be Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them the Vice President. The Legislature may determine the time of choosing and assembling the Electors, and the manner of certifying and transmitting their votes.’
“5. Section 2. ‘No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; nor shall any person be elected to that office who shall be under the age of thirty-five years, and who has not been, in the whole, at least fourteen years a resident within the United States.’
“6. Section 3. ‘The Vice President shall be ex officio President of the Senate; except when they sit to try the impeachment of the President; in which case the Chief Justice shall preside, and excepting also when he shall exercise the powers and duties of President; in which case, and in case of his absence, the Senate shall choose a president pro tempore. The Vice President, when acting as President of the Senate, shall not have a vote unless the House be equally divided.’
“7. Section 4. ‘The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall have power to make treaties; and he shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, and other public ministers, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise herein provided for. But no treaty shall be made without the consent of two thirds of the members present.’
“8. After the words, ‘into the service of the United States,’ in Section 2, Article 10, add ‘and may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the Executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.’
“9. The latter part of Section 2, Article 10, to read as follows: ‘He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction by the Senate, for treason or bribery; and in case of his removal as aforesaid, death, absence, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers or duties of his office, the Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties until another President be chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed.’”
The first clause of the Report was agreed to, nem. con.
The second clause was also agreed to, nem. con.
The third clause was postponed, in order to decide previously on the mode of electing the President.
The fourth clause was accordingly taken up.
Mr. GORHAM disapproved of making the next highest after the President the Vice President, without referring the decision to the Senate in case the next highest should have less than a majority of votes. As the regulation stands, a very obscure man with very few votes may arrive at that appointment.
Mr. SHERMAN said the object of this clause of the Report of the Committee was to get rid of the ineligibility which was attached to the mode of election by the Legislature, and to render the Executive independent of the Legislature. As the choice of the President was to be made out of the five highest, obscure characters were sufficiently guarded against in that case; and he had no objection to requiring the Vice President to be chosen in like manner, where the choice was not decided by a majority in the first instance.
Mr. MADISON was apprehensive that by requiring both the President and Vice President to be chosen out of the five highest candidates, the attention of the electors would be turned too much to making candidates, instead of giving their votes in order to a definitive choice. Should this turn be given to the business, the election would in fact be consigned to the Senate altogether. It would have the effect, at the same time, he observed, of giving the nomination of the candidates to the largest States.
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS said, he would give the reasons of the Committee, and his own. The first was the danger of intrigue and faction, if the appointment should be made by the Legislature. The next was the inconvenience of an ineligibility required by that mode, in order to lessen its evils. The third was the difficulty of establishing a court of impeachments, other than the Senate, which would not be so proper for the trial, nor the other branch, for the impeachment of the President, if appointed by the Legislature. In the fourth place, nobody had appeared to be satisfied with an appointment by the Legislature. In the fifth place, many were anxious even for an immediate choice by the people. And finally, the sixth reason was the indispensable necessity of making the Executive independent of the Legislature. As the electors would vote at the same time, throughout the United States, and at so great a distance from each other, the great evil of cabal was avoided. It would be impossible, also, to corrupt them. A conclusive reason for making the Senate, instead of the Supreme Court, the judge of impeachments, was, that the latter was to try the President, after the trial of the impeachment.
Colonel MASON confessed that the plan of the Committee had removed some capital objections, particularly the danger of cabal and corruption. It was liable, however, to this strong objection, that nineteen times in twenty the President would be chosen by the Senate, an improper body for the purpose.
Mr. BUTLER thought the mode not free from objections; but much more so than an election by the legislature, where, as in elective monarchies, cabal, faction, and violence would be sure to prevail.
Mr. PINCKNEY stated as objections to the mode, — first, that it threw the whole appointment in fact, into the hands of the Senate. Secondly, the electors will be strangers to the several candidates, and of course unable to decide on their comparative merits. Thirdly, it makes the Executive reëligible, which will endanger the public liberty. Fourthly, it makes the same body of men which will, in fact, elect the President, his judges in case of an impeachment.
Mr. WILLIAMSON had great doubts whether the advantage of reëligibility would balance the objection to such a dependence of the President on the Senate for his reappointment. He thought, at least, the Senate ought to be restrained to the two highest on the list.
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS said, the principal advantage aimed at was, that of taking away the opportunity for cabal. The President may be made, if thought necessary, ineligible, on this as well as on any other mode of election. Other inconveniences may be no less redressed on this plan than any other.
Mr. BALDWIN thought the plan not so objectionable, when well considered, as at first view. The increasing intercourse among the people of the States would render important characters less and less unknown; and the Senate would consequently be less and less likely to have the eventual appointment thrown into their hands.
Mr. WILSON. This subject has greatly divided the House, and will also divide the people out of doors. It is in truth the most difficult of all on which we have had to decide. He had never made up an opinion on it entirely to his own satisfaction. He thought the plan, on the whole, a valuable improvement on the former. It gets rid of one great evil, that of cabal and corruption; and Continental characters will multiply as we more and more coalesce, so as to enable the Electors in every part of the Union to know and judge of them. It clears the way also for a discussion of the question of reëligibility, on its own merits, which the former mode of election seemed to forbid. He thought it might be better, however, to refer the eventual appointment to the Legislature than to the Senate, and to confine it to a smaller number than five of the candidates. The eventual election by the Legislature would not open cabal anew, as it would be restrained to certain designated objects of choice; and as these must have had the previous sanction of a number of the States; and if the election be made as it ought, as soon as the votes of the Electors are opened, and it is known that no one has a majority of the whole, there can be little danger of corruption. Another reason for preferring the Legislature to the Senate in this business was, that the House of Representatives will be so often changed as to be free from the influence, and faction, to which the permanence of the Senate may subject that branch.
Mr. RANDOLPH preferred the former mode of constituting the Executive; but if the change was to be made, he wished to know why the eventual election was referred to the Senate, and not to the Legislature? He saw no necessity for this, and many objections to it. He was apprehensive, also, that the advantage of the eventual appointment would fall into the hands of the States near the seat of government.
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS said the Senate was preferred because fewer could then say to the President, “You owe your appointment to us.” He thought the President would not depend so much on the Senate for his reappointment, as on his general good conduct.
The further consideration of the Report was postponed, that each member might take a copy of the remainder of it.
The following motion was referred to the Committee of Eleven, to wit, to prepare and report a plan for defraying the expenses of the Convention.
Mr. PINCKNEY moved a clause declaring, that each House should be judge of the privileges of its own members.2
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS seconded the motion.
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS thought it so plain a case, that no postponement could be necessary.
Mr. WILSON thought the power involved, and the express insertion of it, needless. It might beget doubts as to the power of other public bodies, as courts, &c. Every court is the judge of its own privileges.
Mr. MADISON distinguished between the power of judging of privileges previously and duly established, and the effect of the motion, which would give a discretion to each House as to the extent of its own privileges. He suggested, that it would be better to make provision for ascertaining by law the privileges of each House, than to allow each House to decide for itself. He suggested, also, the necessity of considering what privileges ought to be allowed to the Executive.
1 This is an exact copy. The variations in that in the printed Journal are occasioned by its incorporation of subsequent amendments. This remark is applicable to other cases. Return to text
2This motion is not contained in the printed Journal. Return to text