State of the Union Address

Woodrow Wilson

December 07, 1915

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS:

Since I last had the privilege of addressing you on the state of the Union
the war of nations on the other side of the sea, which had then only begun
to disclose its portentous proportions, has extended its threatening and
sinister scope until it has swept within its flame some portion of every
quarter of the globe, not excepting our own hemisphere, has altered the
whole face of international affairs, and now presents a prospect of
reorganization and reconstruction such as statesmen and peoples have never
been called upon to attempt before.

We have stood apart, studiously neutral. It was our manifest duty to do so.
Not only did we have no part or interest in the policies which seem to have
brought the conflict on; it was necessary, if a universal catastrophe was
to be avoided, that a limit should be set to the sweep of destructive war
and that some part of the great family of nations should keep the processes
of peace alive, if only to prevent collective economic ruin and the
breakdown throughout the world of the industries by which its populations
are fed and sustained. It was manifestly the duty of the self-governed
nations of this hemisphere to redress, if possible, the balance of economic
loss and confusion in the other, if they could do nothing more. In the day
of readjustment and recuperation we earnestly hope and believe that they
can be of infinite service.

In this neutrality, to which they were bidden not only by their separate
life and their habitual detachment from the politics of Europe but also by
a clear perception of international duty, the states of America have become
conscious of a new and more vital community of interest and moral
partnership in affairs, more clearly conscious of the many common
sympathies and interests and duties which bid them stand together.

There was a time in the early days of our own great nation and of the
republics fighting their way to independence in Central and South America
when the government of the United States looked upon itself as in some sort
the guardian of the republics to the South of her as against any
encroachments or efforts at political control from the other side of the
water; felt it its duty to play the part even without invitation from them;
and I think that we can claim that the task was undertaken with a true and
disinterested enthusiasm for the freedom of the Americas and the unmolested
self-government of her independent peoples. But it was always difficult to
maintain such a role without offense to the pride of the peoples whose
freedom of action we sought to protect, and without provoking serious
misconceptions of our motives, and every thoughtful man of affairs must
welcome the altered circumstances of the new day in whose light we now
stand, when there is no claim of guardianship or thought of wards but,
instead, a full and honorable association as of partners between ourselves
and our neighbors, in the interest of all America, north and south. Our
concern for the independence and prosperity of the states of Central and
South America is not altered. We retain unabated the spirit that has
inspired us throughout the whole life of our government and which was so
frankly put into words by President Monroe. We still mean always to make a
common cause of national independence and of political liberty in America.
But that purpose is now better understood so far as it concerns ourselves.
It is known not to be a selfish purpose. It is known to have in it no
thought of taking advantage of any government in this hemisphere or playing
its political fortunes for our own benefit. All the governments of America
stand, so far as we are concerned, upon a footing of genuine equality and
unquestioned independence.

We have been put to the test in the case of Mexico, and we have stood the
test. Whether we have benefited Mexico by the course we have pursued
remains to be seen. Her fortunes are in her own hands. But we have at least
proved that we will not take advantage of her in her distress and undertake
to impose upon her an order and government of our own choosing. Liberty is
often a fierce and intractable thing, to which no bounds can be set, and to
which no bounds of a few men’s choosing ought ever to be set. Every
American who has drunk at the true fountains of principle and tradition
must subscribe without reservation to the high doctrine of the Virginia
Bill of Rights, which in the great days in which our government was set up
was everywhere amongst us accepted as the creed of free men. That doctrine
is, “That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit,
protection, and security of the people, nation, or community”; that “of all
the various modes and forms of government, that is the best which is
capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is
most effectually secured against the danger of maladministration; and that,
when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these
purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, inalienable, and
indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall
be judged most conducive to the public weal.” We have unhesitatingly
applied that heroic principle to the case of Mexico, and now hopefully
await the rebirth of the troubled Republic, which had so much of which to
purge itself and so little sympathy from any outside quarter in the radical
but necessary process. We will aid and befriend Mexico, but we will not
coerce her; and our course with regard to her ought to be sufficient proof
to all America that we seek no political suzerainty or selfish control.

The moral is, that the states of America are not hostile rivals but
coöperating friends, and that their growing sense of community or interest,
alike in matters political and in matters economic, is likely to give them
a new significance as factors in international affairs and in the political
history of the world. It presents them as in a very deep and true sense a
unit in world affairs, spiritual partners, standing together because
thinking together, quick with common sympathies and common ideals.
Separated they are subject to all the cross currents of the confused
politics of a world of hostile rivalries; united in spirit and purpose they
cannot be disappointed of their peaceful destiny.

This is Pan-Americanism. It has none of the spirit of empire in it. It is
the embodiment, the effectual embodiment, of the spirit of law and
independence and liberty and mutual service.

A very notable body of men recently met in the City of Washington, at the
invitation and as the guests of this Government, whose deliberations are
likely to be looked back to as marking a memorable turning point in the
history of America. They were representative spokesmen of the several
independent states of this hemisphere and were assembled to discuss the
financial and commercial relations of the republics of the two continents
which nature and political fortune have so intimately linked together. I
earnestly recommend to your perusal the reports of their proceedings and of
the actions of their committees. You will get from them, I think, a fresh
conception of the ease and intelligence and advantage with which Americans
of both continents may draw together in practical coöperation and of what
the material foundations of this hopeful partnership of interest must
consist,–of how we should build them and of how necessary it is that we
should hasten their building.

There is, I venture to point out, an especial significance just now
attaching to this whole matter of drawing the Americans together in bonds
of honorable partnership and mutual advantage because of the economic
readjustments which the world must inevitably witness within the next
generation, when peace shall have at last resumed its healthful tasks. In
the performance of these tasks I believe the Americas to be destined to
play their parts together. I am interested to fix your attention on this
prospect now because unless you take it within your view and permit the
full significance of it to command your thought I cannot find the right
light in which to set forth the particular matter that lies at the very
font of my whole thought as I address you to-day. I mean national defense.

No one who really comprehends the spirit of the great people for whom we
are appointed to speak can fail to perceive that their passion is for
peace, their genius best displayed in the practice of the arts of peace.
Great democracies are not belligerent. They do not seek or desire war.
Their thought is of individual liberty and of the free labor that supports
life and the uncensored thought that quickens it. Conquest and dominion are
not in our reckoning, or agreeable to our principles. But just because we
demand unmolested development and the undisturbed government of our own
lives upon our own principles of right and liberty, we resent, from
whatever quarter it may come, the aggression we ourselves will not
practice. We insist upon security in prosecuting our self—chosen lines of
national development. We do more than that. We demand it also for others.
We do not confine our enthusiasm for individual liberty and free national
development to the incidents and movements of affairs which affect only
ourselves. We feel it wherever there is a people that tries to walk in
these difficult paths of independence and right. From the first we have
made common cause with all partisans of liberty on this side the sea, and
have deemed it as important that our neighbors should be free from all
outside domination as that we ourselves should be. We have set America
aside as a whole for the uses of independent nations and political freemen.

Out of such thoughts grow all our policies. We regard war merely as a means
of asserting the rights of a people against aggression. And we are as
fiercely jealous of coercive or dictatorial power within our own nation as
of aggression from without. We will not maintain a standing army except for
uses which are as necessary in times of peace as in times of war; and we
shall always see to it that our military peace establishment is no larger
than is actually and continuously needed for the uses of days in which no
enemies move against us. But we do believe in a body of free citizens ready
and sufficient to take care of themselves and of the governments which they
have set up to serve them. In our constitutions themselves we have
commanded that “the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed,” and our confidence has been that our safety in times of danger
would lie in the rising of the nation to take care of itself, as the
farmers rose at Lexington.

But war has never been a mere matter of men and guns. It is a thing of
disciplined might. If our citizens are ever to fight effectively upon a
sudden summons, they must know how modern fighting is done, and what to do
when the summons comes to render themselves immediately available and
immediately effective. And the government must be their servant in this
matter, must supply them with the training they need to take care of
themselves and of it. The military arm of their government, which they will
not allow to direct them, they may properly use to serve them and make
their independence secure,–and not their own independence merely but the
rights also of those with whom they have made common cause, should they
also be put in jeopardy. They must be fitted to play the great role in the
world, and particularly in this hemisphere, for which they are qualified by
principle and by chastened ambition to play.

It is with these ideals in mind that the plans of the Department of War for
more adequate national defense were conceived which will be laid before
you, and which I urge you to sanction and put into effect as soon as they
can be properly scrutinized and discussed. They seem to me the essential
first steps, and they seem to me for the present sufficient.

They contemplate an increase of the standing force of the regular army from
its present strength of five thousand and twenty—three officers and one
hundred and two thousand nine hundred and eighty—five enlisted men of all
services to a strength of seven thousand one hundred and thirty—six
officers and one hundred and thirty—four thousand seven hundred and seven
enlisted men, or 141,843, all told, all services, rank and file, by the
addition of fifty—two companies of coast artillery, fifteen companies of
engineers, ten regiments of infantry, four regiments of field artillery,
and four aero squadrons, besides seven hundred and fifty officers required
for a great variety of extra service, especially the all important duty of
training the citizen force of which I shall presently speak, seven hundred
and ninety—two noncommissioned officers for service in drill, recruiting
and the like, and the necessary quota of enlisted men for the Quartermaster
Corps, the Hospital Corps, the Ordnance Department, and other similar
auxiliary services. These are the additions necessary to render the army
adequate for its present duties, duties which it has to perform not only
upon our own continental coasts and borders and at our interior army posts,
but also in the Philippines, in the Hawaiian Islands, at the Isthmus, and
in Porto Rico.

By way of making the country ready to assert some part of its real power
promptly and upon a larger scale, should occasion arise, the plan also
contemplates supplementing the army by a force of four hundred thousand
disciplined citizens, raised in increments of one hundred and thirty—three
thousand a year throughout a period of three years. This it is proposed to
do by a process of enlistment under which the serviceable men of the
country would be asked to bind themselves to serve with the colors for
purposes of training for short periods throughout three years, and to come
to the colors at call at any time throughout an additional “furlough”
period of three years. This force of four hundred thousand men would be
provided with personal accoutrements as fast as enlisted and their
equipment for the field made ready to be supplied at any time. They would
be assembled for training at stated intervals at convenient places in
association with suitable units of the regular army. Their period of annual
training would not necessarily exceed two months in the year.

It would depend upon the patriotic feeling of the younger men of the
country whether they responded to such a call to service or not. It would
depend upon the patriotic spirit of the employers of the country whether
they made it possible for the younger men in their employ to respond under
favorable conditions or not. I, for one, do not doubt the patriotic
devotion either of our young men or of those who give them
employment,–those for whose benefit and protection they would in fact
enlist. I would look forward to the success of such an experiment with
entire confidence.

At least so much by way of preparation for defense seems to me to be
absolutely imperative now. We cannot do less.

The programme which will be laid before you by the Secretary of the Navy is
similarly conceived. It involves only a shortening of the time within which
plans long matured shall be carried out; but it does make definite and
explicit a programme which has heretofore been only implicit, held in the
minds of the Committees on Naval Affairs and disclosed in the debates of
the two Houses but nowhere formulated or formally adopted. It seems to me
very clear that it will be to the advantage of the country for the Congress
to adopt a comprehensive plan for putting the navy upon a final footing of
strength and efficiency and to press that plan to completion within the
next five years. We have always looked to the navy of the country as our
first and chief line of defense; we have always seen it to be our manifest
course of prudence to be strong on the seas. Year by year we have been
creating a navy which now ranks very high indeed among the navies of the
maritime nations. We should now definitely determine how we shall complete
what we have begun, and how soon.

The programme to be laid before you contemplates the construction within
five years of ten battleships, six battle cruisers, ten scout cruisers,
fifty destroyers, fifteen fleet submarines, eighty—five coast submarines,
four gunboats, one hospital ship, two ammunition ships, two fuel oil ships,
and one repair ship. It is proposed that of this number we shall the first
year provide for the construction of two battleships, two battle cruisers,
three scout cruisers, fifteen destroyers, five fleet submarines,
twenty—five coast submarines, two gunboats, and one hospital ship; the
second year, two battleships, one scout cruiser, ten destroyers, four fleet
submarines, fifteen coast submarines, one gunboat, and one fuel oil ship;
the third year, two battleships, one battle cruiser, two scout cruisers,
five destroyers, two fleet sub marines, and fifteen coast submarines; the
fourth year, two battleships, two battle cruisers, two scout cruisers, ten
destroyers, two fleet submarines, fifteen coast submarines, one ammunition
ship, and one fuel oil ship; and the fifth year, two battleships, one
battle cruiser, two scout cruisers, ten destroyers, two fleet submarines,
fifteen coast submarines, one gunboat, one ammunition ship, and one repair
ship.

The Secretary of the Navy is asking also for the immediate addition to the
personnel of the navy of seven thousand five hundred sailors, twenty—five
hundred apprentice seamen, and fifteen hundred marines. This increase would
be sufficient to care for the ships which are to be completed within the
fiscal year 1917 and also for the number of men which must be put in
training to man the ships which will be completed early in 1918. It is also
necessary that the number of midshipmen at the Naval academy at Annapolis
should be increased by at least three hundred in order that the force of
officers should be more rapidly added to; and authority is asked to
appoint, for engineering duties only, approved graduates of engineering
colleges, and for service in the aviation corps a certain number of men
taken from civil life.

If this full programme should be carried out we should have built or
building in 1921, according to the estimates of survival and standards of
classification followed by the General Board of the Department, an
effective navy consisting of twenty—seven battleships of the first line,
six battle cruisers, twenty—five battleships of the second line, ten
armored cruisers, thirteen scout cruisers, five first class cruisers, three
second class cruisers, ten third class cruisers, one hundred and eight
destroyers, eighteen fleet submarines, one hundred and fifty—seven coast
submarines, six monitors, twenty gunboats, four supply ships, fifteen fuel
ships, four transports, three tenders to torpedo vessels, eight vessels of
special types, and two ammunition ships. This would be a navy fitted to our
needs and worthy of our traditions.

But armies and instruments of war are only part of what has to be
considered if we are to provide for the supreme matter of national
self—sufficiency and security in all its aspects. There are other great
matters which will be thrust upon our attention whether we will or not.
There is, for example, a very pressing question of trade and shipping
involved in this great problem of national adequacy. It is necessary for
many weighty reasons of national efficiency and development that we should
have a great merchant marine. The great merchant fleet we once used to make
us rich, that great body of sturdy sailors who used to carry our flag into
every sea, and who were the pride and often the bulwark of the nation, we
have almost driven out of existence by inexcusable neglect and indifference
and by a hopelessly blind and provincial policy of so—called economic
protection. It is high time we repaired our mistake and resumed our
commercial independence on the seas.

For it is a question of independence. If other nations go to war or seek to
hamper each other’s commerce, our merchants, it seems, are at their mercy,
to do with as they please. We must use their ships, and use them as they
determine. We have not ships enough of our own. We cannot handle our own
commerce on the seas. Our independence is provincial, and is only on land
and within our own borders. We are not likely to be permitted to use even
the ships of other nations in rivalry of their own trade, and are without
means to extend our commerce even where the doors are wide open and our
goods desired. Such a situation is not to be endured. It is of capital
importance not only that the United States should be its own carrier on the
seas and enjoy the economic independence which only an adequate merchant
marine would give it, but also that the American hemisphere as a whole
should enjoy a like independence and self—sufficiency, if it is not to be
drawn into the tangle of European affairs. Without such independence the
whole question of our political unity and self—determination is very
seriously clouded and complicated indeed.

Moreover, we can develop no true or effective American policy without ships
of our own,–not ships of war, but ships of peace, carrying goods and
carrying much more: creating friendships and rendering indispensable
services to all interests on this side the water. They must move constantly
back and forth between the Americas. They are the only shuttles that can
weave the delicate fabric of sympathy, comprehension, confidence, and
mutual dependence in which we wish to clothe our policy of America for
Americans.

The task of building up an adequate merchant marine for America private
capital must ultimately undertake and achieve, as it has undertaken and
achieved every other like task amongst us in the past, with admirable
enterprise, intelligence, and vigor; and it seems to me a manifest dictate
of wisdom that we should promptly remove every legal obstacle that may
stand in the way of this much to be desired revival of our old independence
and should facilitate in every possible way the building, purchase, and
American registration of ships. But capital cannot accomplish this great
task of a sudden. It must embark upon it by degrees, as the opportunities
of trade develop. Something must be done at once; done to open routes and
develop opportunities where they are as yet undeveloped; done to open the
arteries of trade where the currents have not yet learned to
run,—especially between the two American continents, where they are,
singularly enough, yet to be created and quickened; and it is evident that
only the government can undertake such beginnings and assume the initial
financial risks. When the risk has passed and private capital begins to
find its way in sufficient abundance into these new channels, the
government may withdraw. But it cannot omit to begin. It should take the
first steps, and should take them at once. Our goods must not lie piled up
at our ports and stored upon side tracks in freight cars which are daily
needed on the roads; must not be left without means of transport to any
foreign quarter. We must not await the permission of foreign ship—owners
and foreign governments to send them where we will.

With a view to meeting these pressing necessities of our commerce and
availing ourselves at the earliest possible moment of the present
unparalleled opportunity of linking the two Americas together in bonds of
mutual interest and service, an opportunity which may never return again if
we miss it now, proposals will be made to the present Congress for the
purchase or construction of ships to be owned and directed by the
government similar to those made to the last Congress, but modified in some
essential particulars. I recommend these proposals to you for your prompt
acceptance with the more confidence because every month that has elapsed
since the former proposals were made has made the necessity for such action
more and more manifestly imperative. That need was then foreseen; it is now
acutely felt and everywhere realized by those for whom trade is waiting but
who can find no conveyance for their goods. I am not so much interested in
the particulars of the programme as I am in taking immediate advantage of
the great opportunity which awaits us if we will but act in this emergency.
In this matter, as in all others, a spirit of common counsel should
prevail, and out of it should come an early solution of this pressing
problem.

There is another matter which seems to me to be very intimately associated
with the question of national safety and preparation for defense. That is
our policy towards the Philippines and the people of Porto Rico. Our
treatment of them and their attitude towards us are manifestly of the first
consequence in the development of our duties in the world and in getting a
free hand to perform those duties. We must be free from every unnecessary
burden or embarrassment; and there is no better way to be clear of
embarrassment than to fulfil our promises and promote the interests of
those dependent on us to the utmost. Bills for the alteration and reform of
the government of the Philippines and for rendering fuller political
justice to the people of Porto Rico were submitted to the sixty—third
Congress. They will be submitted also to you. I need not particularize
their details. You are most of you already familiar with them. But I do
recommend them to your early adoption with the sincere conviction that
there are few measures you could adopt which would more serviceably clear
the way for the great policies by which we wish to make good, now and
always, our right to lead in enterprises of peace and good will and
economic and political freedom.

The plans for the armed forces of the nation which I have outlined, and for
the general policy of adequate preparation for mobilization and defense,
involve of course very large additional expenditures of money,–expenditures
which will considerably exceed the estimated revenues of the government. It
is made my duty by law, whenever the estimates of expenditure exceed the
estimates of revenue, to call the attention of the Congress to the fact and
suggest any means of meeting the deficiency that it may be wise or possible
for me to suggest. I am ready to believe that it would be my duty to do so
in any case; and I feel particularly bound to speak of the matter when it
appears that the deficiency will arise directly out of the adoption by the
Congress of measures which I myself urge it to adopt. Allow me, therefore,
to speak briefly of the present state of the Treasury and of the fiscal
problems which the next year will probably disclose.

On the thirtieth of June last there was an available balance in the general
fund of the Treasury Of $104,170,105.78. The total estimated receipts for
the year 1916, on the assumption that the emergency revenue measure passed
by the last Congress will not be extended beyond its present limit, the
thirty—first of December, 1915, and that the present duty of one cent per
pound on sugar will be discontinued after the first of May, 1916, will be
$670,365,500. The balance of June last and these estimated revenues come,
therefore, to a grand total of $774,535,605—78. The total estimated
disbursements for the present fiscal year, including twenty—five millions
for the Panama Canal, twelve millions for probable deficiency
appropriations, and fifty thousand dollars for miscellaneous debt
redemptions, will be $753,891,000; and the balance in the general fund of
the Treasury will be reduced to $20,644,605.78. The emergency revenue act,
if continued beyond its present time limitation, would produce, during the
half year then remaining, about forty—one millions. The duty of one cent
per pound on sugar, if continued, would produce during the two months of
the fiscal year remaining after the first of May, about fifteen millions.
These two sums, amounting together to fifty—six millions, if added to the
revenues of the second half of the fiscal year, would yield the Treasury at
the end of the year an available balance Of $76,644,605—78.

The additional revenues required to carry out the programme of military and
naval preparation of which I have spoken, would, as at present estimated,
be for the fiscal year, 1917, $93,800,000. Those figures, taken with the
figures for the present fiscal year which I have already given, disclose
our financial problem for the year 1917. Assuming that the taxes imposed by
the emergency revenue act and the present duty on sugar are to be
discontinued, and that the balance at the close of the present fiscal year
will be only $20,644,605.78, that the disbursements for the Panama Canal
will again be about twenty—five millions, and that the additional
expenditures for the army and navy are authorized by the Congress, the
deficit in the general fund of the Treasury on the thirtieth of June, 1917,
will be nearly two hundred and thirty—five millions. To this sum at least
fifty millions should be added to represent a safe working balance for the
Treasury, and twelve millions to include the usual deficiency estimates in
1917; and these additions would make a total deficit of some two hundred
and ninety—seven millions. If the present taxes should be continued
throughout this year and the next, however, there would be a balance in the
Treasury of some seventy—six and a half millions at the end of the present
fiscal year, and a deficit at the end of the next year of only some fifty
millions, or, reckoning in sixty—two millions for deficiency appropriations
and a safe Treasury balance at the end of the year, a total deficit of some
one hundred and twelve millions. The obvious moral of the figures is that
it is a plain counsel of prudence to continue all of the present taxes or
their equivalents, and confine ourselves to the problem of providing one
hundred and twelve millions of new revenue rather than two hundred and
ninety—seven millions.

How shall we obtain the new revenue? We are frequently reminded that there
are many millions of bonds which the Treasury is authorized under existing
law to sell to reimburse the sums paid out of current revenues for the
construction of the Panama Canal; and it is true that bonds to the amount
of approximately $222,000,000 are now available for that purpose. Prior to
1913, $134,631,980 of these bonds had actually been sold to recoup the
expenditures at the Isthmus; and now constitute a considerable item of the
public debt. But I, for one, do not believe that the people of this country
approve of postponing the payment of their bills. Borrowing money is
short—sighted finance. It can be justified only when permanent things are
to be accomplished which many generations will certainly benefit by and
which it seems hardly fair that a single generation should pay for. The
objects we are now proposing to spend money for cannot be so classified,
except in the sense that everything wisely done may be said to be done in
the interest of posterity as well as in our own. It seems to me a clear
dictate of prudent statesmanship and frank finance that in what we are now,
I hope, about to undertake we should pay as we go. The people of the
country are entitled to know just what burdens of taxation they are to
carry, and to know from the outset, now. The new bills should be paid by
internal taxation.

To what sources, then, shall we turn? This is so peculiarly a question
which the gentlemen of the House of Representatives are expected under the
Constitution to propose an answer to that you will hardly expect me to do
more than discuss it in very general terms. We should be following an
almost universal example of modern governments if we were to draw the
greater part or even the whole of the revenues we need from the income
taxes. By somewhat lowering the present limits of exemption and the figure
at which the surtax shall begin to be imposed, and by increasing, step by
step throughout the present graduation, the surtax itself, the income taxes
as at present apportioned would yield sums sufficient to balance the books
of the Treasury at the end of the fiscal year 1917 without anywhere making
the burden unreasonably or oppressively heavy. The precise reckonings are
fully and accurately set out in the report of the Secretary of the Treasury
which will be immediately laid before you.

And there are many additional sources of revenue which can justly be
resorted to without hampering the industries of the country or putting any
too great charge upon individual expenditure. A tax of one cent per gallon
on gasoline and naphtha would yield, at the present estimated production,
$10,000,000; a tax of fifty cents per horse power on automobiles and
internal explosion engines, $15,000,000; a stamp tax on bank cheques,
probably $18,000,000; a tax of twenty—five cents per ton on pig iron,
$10,000,000; a tax of twenty—five cents per ton on fabricated iron and
steel, probably $10,000,000. In a country of great industries like this it
ought to be easy to distribute the burdens of taxation without making them
anywhere bear too heavily or too exclusively upon any one set of persons or
undertakings. What is clear is, that the industry of this generation should
pay the bills of this generation.

I have spoken to you to—day, Gentlemen, upon a single theme, the thorough
preparation of the nation to care for its own security and to make sure of
entire freedom to play the impartial role in this hemisphere and in the
world which we all believe to have been providentially assigned to it. I
have had in my mind no thought of any immediate or particular danger
arising out of our relations with other nations. We are at peace with all
the nations of the world, and there is reason to hope that no question in
controversy between this and other Governments will lead to any serious
breach of amicable relations, grave as some differences of attitude and
policy have been land may yet turn out to be. I am sorry to say that the
gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been uttered
within our own borders. There are citizens of the United States, I blush to
admit, born under other flags but welcomed under our generous
naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who
have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national
life; who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our
Government into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they thought
it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them, and to debase
our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue. Their number is not great as
compared with the whole number of those sturdy hosts by which our nation
has been enriched in recent generations out of virile foreign stock; but it
is great enough to have brought deep disgrace upon us and to have made it
necessary that we should promptly make use of processes of law by which we
may be purged of their corrupt distempers. America never witnessed anything
like this before. It never dreamed it possible that men sworn into its own
citizenship, men drawn out of great free stocks such as supplied some of
the best and strongest elements of that little, but how heroic, nation that
in a high day of old staked its very life to free itself from every
entanglement that had darkened the fortunes of the older nations and set up
a new standard here, that men of such origins and such free choices of
allegiance would ever turn in malign reaction against the Government and
people who had welcomed and nurtured them and seek to make this proud
country once more a hotbed of European passion. A little while ago such a
thing would have seemed incredible. Because it was incredible we made no
preparation for it. We would have been almost ashamed to prepare for it, as
if we were suspicious of ourselves, our own comrades and neighbors! But the
ugly and incredible thing has actually come about and we are without
adequate federal laws to deal with it. I urge you to enact such laws at the
earliest possible moment and feel that in doing so I am urging you to do
nothing less than save the honor and self—respect of the nation. Such
creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out. They are
not many, but they are infinitely malignant, and the hand of our power
should close over them at once. They have formed plots to destroy property,
they have entered into conspiracies against the neutrality of the
Government, they have sought to pry into every confidential transaction of
the Government in order to serve interests alien to our own. It is possible
to deal with these things very effectually. I need not suggest the terms in
which they may be dealt with.

I wish that it could be said that only a few men, misled by mistaken
sentiments of allegiance to the governments under which they were born, had
been guilty of disturbing the self—possession and misrepresenting the
temper and principles of the country during these days of terrible war,
when it would seem that every man who was truly an American would
instinctively make it his duty and his pride to keep the scales of judgment
even and prove himself a partisan of no nation but his own. But it cannot.
There are some men among us, and many resident abroad who, though born and
bred in the United States and calling themselves Americans, have so
forgotten themselves and their honor as citizens as to put their passionate
sympathy with one or the other side in the great European conflict above
their regard for the peace and dignity of the United States. They also
preach and practice disloyalty. No laws, I suppose, can reach corruptions
of the mind and heart; but I should not speak of others without also
speaking of these and expressing the even deeper humiliation and scorn
which every self—possessed and thoughtfully patriotic American must feel
when he thinks of them and of the discredit they are daily bringing upon
us.

While we speak of the preparation of the nation to make sure of her
security and her effective power we must not fall into the patent error of
supposing that her real strength comes from armaments and mere safeguards
of written law. It comes, of course, from her people, their energy, their
success in their undertakings, their free opportunity to use the natural
resources of our great home land and of the lands outside our continental
borders which look to us for protection, for encouragement, and for
assistance in their development; from the organization and freedom and
vitality of our economic life. The domestic questions which engaged the
attention of the last Congress are more vital to the nation in this its
time of test than at any other time. We cannot adequately make ready for
any trial of our strength unless we wisely and promptly direct the force of
our laws into these all—important fields of domestic action. A matter which
it seems to me we should have very much at heart is the creation of the
right instrumentalities by which to mobilize our economic resources in any
time of national necessity. I take it for granted that I do not need your
authority to call into systematic consultation with the directing officers
of the army and navy men of recognized leadership and ability from among
our citizens who are thoroughly familiar, for example, with the
transportation facilities of the country and therefore competent to advise
how they may be coördinated when the need arises, those who can suggest the
best way in which to bring about prompt coöperation among the manufacturers
of the country, should it be necessary, and those who could assist to bring
the technical skill of the country to the aid of the Government in the
solution of particular problems of defense. I only hope that if I should
find it feasible to constitute such an advisory body the Congress would be
willing to vote the small sum of money that would be needed to defray the
expenses that would probably be necessary to give it the clerical and
administrative Machinery with which to do serviceable work.

What is more important is, that the industries and resources of the country
should be available and ready for mobilization. It is the more imperatively
necessary, therefore, that we should promptly devise means for doing what
we have not yet done: that we should give intelligent federal aid and
stimulation to industrial and vocational education, as we have long done in
the large field of our agricultural industry; that, at the same time that
we safeguard and conserve the natural resources of the country we should
put them at the disposal of those who will use them promptly and
intelligently, as was sought to be done in the admirable bills submitted to
the last Congress from its committees on the public lands, bills which I
earnestly recommend in principle to your consideration; that we should put
into early operation some provision for rural credits which will add to the
extensive borrowing facilities already afforded the farmer by the Reserve
Bank Act, adequate instrumentalities by which long credits may be obtained
on land mortgages; and that we should study more carefully than they have
hitherto been studied the right adaptation of our economic arrangements to
changing conditions.

Many conditions about which we I—lave repeatedly legislated are being
altered from decade to decade, it is evident, under our very eyes, and are
likely to change even more rapidly and more radically in the days
immediately ahead of us, when peace has returned to the world and the
nations of Europe once more take up their tasks of commerce and industry
with the energy of those who must bestir themselves to build anew. Just
what these changes will be no one can certainly foresee or confidently
predict. There are no calculable, because no stable, elements in the
problem. The most we can do is to make certain that we have the necessary
instrumentalities of information constantly at our service so that we may
be sure that we know exactly what we are dealing with when we come to act,
if it should be necessary to act at all. We must first certainly know what
it is that we are seeking to adapt ourselves to. I may ask the privilege of
addressing you more at length on this important matter a little later in
your session.

In the meantime may I make this suggestion? The transportation problem is
an exceedingly serious and pressing one in this country. There has from
time to time of late been reason to fear that our railroads would not much
longer be able to cope with it successfully, as at present equipped and
coordinated I suggest that it would be wise to provide for a commission of
inquiry to ascertain by a thorough canvass of the whole question whether
our laws as at present framed and administered are as serviceable as they
might be in the solution of the problem. It is obviously a problem that
lies at the very foundation of our efficiency as a people. Such an inquiry
ought to draw out every circumstance and opinion worth considering and we
need to know all sides of the matter if we mean to do anything in the field
of federal legislation.

No one, I am sure, would wish to take any backward step. The regulation of
the railways of the country by federal commission has had admirable results
and has fully justified the hopes and expectations of those by whom the
policy of regulation was originally proposed. The question is not what
should we undo? It is, whether there is anything else we can do that would
supply us with effective means, in the very process of regulation, for
bettering the conditions under which the railroads are operated and for
making them more useful servants of the country as a whole. It seems to me
that it might be the part of wisdom, therefore, before further legislation
in this field is attempted, to look at the whole problem of coordination
and efficiency in the full light of a fresh assessment of circumstance and
opinion, as a guide to dealing with the several parts of it.

For what we are seeking now, what in my mind is the single thought of this
message, is national efficiency and security. We serve a great nation. We
should serve it in the spirit of its peculiar genius. It is the genius of
common men for self—government, industry, justice, liberty and peace. We
should see to it that it lacks no instrument, no facility or vigor of law,
to make it sufficient to play its part with energy, safety, and assured
success. In this we are no partisans but heralds and prophets of a new age.

 

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