Notes of Alexander Hamilton in the Federal Convention of 1787

Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States

Selected, Arranged, and Indexed by Charles C. Tansill

Notes of Alexander Hamilton in the Federal Convention of 1787. 1

I. NOTES FOR JUNE 1, 1787.

II. NOTES FOR JUNE 6, 7, AND 8, 1787.

Sent:
A free government to be preferred to an absolute monarchy not because of the occasional violations of liberty or Property but because of the tendency of the Free Government to interest the passions of the community in its favour beget public spirit and public confidence—
Re: When public mind is prepared to adopt the present plan they will outgo our proposition—They will never part with Sovereignty of the state till they are tired [?] of the state governments—
Mr. Pinkney. If Legislatures do not partake in the appointment of they will be more jealous

Pinckney—Elections by the state legislatures will be better than those by the people—
Principle—Danger that the Executive by too frequent communication with the judicial may corrupt it—They may learn to enter into his passions—
Note—At the period which terminates the duration of the Executive there will be always an awful crisis—in the National situation.
Note. The arguments to prove that a negative would not be used would go so far as to prove that the revisionary power would not be exercised.

Mr. Mason—The purse and sword will be in the hands of the [executive struck out]—legislature.

I One great defect of our Governments are that they do not present objects sufficiently interesting to the human mind.
I—A reason for leaving little or nothing to the state legislatures will be that as their objects are diminished they will be worse composed—Proper men will be less inclined to participate in them—

[June 7, 1787.]

[June 8, 1787.]

Pinckney—For general Negative—
Gerry—Is for a negative on paper emissions—
New States will arise which cannot be controuled—and may outweigh and controul—
Wilson—Foreign influence may infect certain corners of confederacy what ought to be restrained—
Union basis of our oppos and Ind[ependence]:

III. NOTES FOR JUNE 6 AND. 8, 1787.
PRINCIPLES

I—Human mind fond of Compromise—Maddisons Theory—
Two principles upon which republics ought to be constructed—
I that they have such extent as to render combinations on the ground of Interest difficult—
II By a process of election calculated to refine the representation of the People—
Answer—There is truth in both these principles but they do not conclude so strongly as he supposes—
—The Assembly when chosen will meet in one room if they are drawn from half the globe—and will be liable to all the passions of popular assemblies.
If more minute links are wanting others will supply them—Distinctions of Eastern middle and Southern states will come into view; between commercial and non commercial states—Imaginary lines will influence etc. Human mind prone to limit its view by near and local objects—
Paper money is capable of giving a general impulse—It is easy to conceive a popular sentiment pervading the E. states—
Observ: large districts less liable to be influenced by factious demmagogues than small—
Note—This is in some degree true but not so generally as may be supposed—Frequently small portions of the large districts carry elections—An influential demagogue will give an impulse to the whole—Demagogues are not always inconsiderable persons—Patricians were frequently demagogues—Characters are less known and a less active interest taken in them—

[June 8, 1787.]

IV. NOTES FOR JUNE 16 AND 19, 1787.

Mr. Lansing—N[ew] S[ystem]—proposes to draw representation from the whole body of people, without regard to S[tate] sovereignties—
Subs: proposes to preserve the State Sovereignties—
Powers—Different Legislatures had a different object—
—Revise the Confederation—
Ind. States cannot be supposed to be willing to annihilate the States—
State of New York would not have agreed to send members on this ground—
In vain to devise systems however good which will not be adopted—
If convulsions happen nothing we can do will give them a direction—
Legislatures cannot be expected to make such a sacrifice—
The wisest men in forming a system from theory apt to be mistaken—
The present national government has no precedent or experience to support it—
General opinion that certain additional powers ought to be given to Congress—
Mr. Patterson—1—plan accords with powers
2—accords with sentiments of the People—
If Confederation radically defective we ought to return to our states and tell them so—
Comes not here to sport sentiments of his own but to speak the sense of his Constituents—
—States treat[ed] as equal—
Present Compact gives one Vote to each state.
alterations are to be made by Congress and all the Legislatures—
All parties to a Contract must assent to its dissolution—
States collectively have advantages in which the smaller states do not participate—therefore individual rules do not apply—
—Force of government will not depend on proportion of representation—but on
Quantity of power—
—Check not necessary in a ge[ne]ral government of communities—but
in an individual state spirit of faction is to be checked—
How have Congress hitherto conducted themselves?
The People approve of Congress but they have not powers enough—
—body constituted like Congress from the fewness of their numbers more wisdom and energy—
than the complicated system of Virginia—
—Expence enormous—
180—commons
90—senators

270—

Wilson—Points of Disagreement—

—Empowered to propose everything to conclude nothing—
—Does not think state governments the idols of the people—
Thinks a competent national government will be a favourite of the people—
Complaints from every part of United States that the purposes of government cannot be answered—
—In constituting a government—not merely necessary to give proper powers—but to give them to proper hands—
Two reasons against giving additional powers to Congress—
—First it does not stand on the authority of the people—
Second—It is a single branch—
Inequality—the poison of all governments—
— Lord Chesterfield speaks of a Commission to be obtained for a member of a small province—

Pinkney—
Mr. Elsworth—
Mr. Randolp[h]—Spirit of the People in favour of the Virginian scheme—
We have powers; but if we had not we ought not to scruple—

[June 19, 1787.]

Maddison—Breach of compact in one article releases the whole—
Treaties may still be violated by the states under the Jersey plan—
appellate jurisdiction not sufficient because second trial cannot be had under it—
Attempt made by one of the greatest monarchs of Europe to equalize the local peculiarities of their separate provinces—in which the Agent fell a victim
Mr. Pinckney is of opinion that the first branch ought to be appointed in such manner as the legislatures shall direct—
Impracticable for general legislature to decide contested elections—

V. NOTES FOR JUNE 20, 1787.

Mr. Lansing—Resolved that the powers of legislation ought to be vested in the United States in Congress— — — — —
—If our plan be not adopted it will produce those mischiefs which we are sent to obviate—
Principles of system—
Equality of Representation—
Dependence of members of Congress on State—
So long as state distinctions exist state prejudices will operate whether election be by states or people—
—If no interest to oppress no need of apportionment—

—Virginia 16—Delaware 1—
—Will General Government have leisure to examine state laws—?
—Will G Government have the necessary information?
—Will states agree to surrender?
—Let us meet public opinion and hope the progress of sentiment will make future arrangements—
—Would like my [ Hamilton's] system if it could be established
System without example—

Mr. Mason—Objection to granting power to Congress arose from their constitution.
Sword and purse in one body—

Two principles in which America are unanimous
1 attachment to Republican government
2—to two branches of legislature—
—Military force and liberty incompatible—

—Will people maintain a standing army?—
Will endeavour to preserve state governments and draw lines—trusting to posterity to amend—
Mr. Martin—General Government originally formed for the preservation of state governments—
Objection to giving power to Congress has originated with the legislature—
10 of the states interested in an equal voice—

Real motive was an opinion that there ought to be distinct governments and not a general government—
If we should form a general government twould break to. pieces— — —
—For common safety instituted a General gover[n]ment—
Jealousy of power the motive—
People have delegated all their authority to state governments—
Caution necessary to both systems—
Requisitions necessary upon one system as upon another—
In their system made requisitions necessary in the first instance but left Congress in the second instance to assess themselves—
Judicial tribunals in the different states would become odious— — —
If we always to make a change shall be always in a state of infancy—
→States will not be disposed hereafter to strengthen—the general government.
Mr. Sherman—Confederacy earned us through the war— —
Non compliances of States owing to various embarrassments.

Why should state legislatures be unfriendly?
State governments will always have the confidence and government of the people; if they cannot be conciliated no efficacious government can be established.
Sense of all states that one branch is sufficient—

If consolidated all treaties will be void.
State governments more fit for local legislation customs habits etc.

VI. NOTES, PROBABLY FOR DEBATE OF JUNE 26, 1787

I Every government ought to have the means of self preservation
II—Combinations of a few large states might subvert
II—Could not be abused without a revolt
II Different genius of the states and different composition of the body
NOTE. Senate could not desire [?] to promote such a class
III Uniformity in the time of elections—
Objects of a Senate
To afford a double security against Faction in the house of representatives
Duration of the Senate necessary to its Firmness
Information
sense of national character
Responsibility

1. Text reprinted from the American Historical Review, Vol. X, (Washington, 1905-6) pp. 98-109. Return to text