The Roosevelt administration was dealt a stunning setback in late May 1935 when the Supreme Court found the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA; see Roosevelt’s Fireside Chat On the Purposes and Foundations of the Recovery Program) to be unconstitutional. The decision stemmed from a case in which a small family-owned poultry business in New York City was prosecuted for violating the National Recovery Administration (NRA) code for the poultry industry. Established by the NIRA in 1933, the NRA sought to coordinate the activities of labor, industry and government through voluntary codes to reduce what the Roosevelt administration thought was harmful competition. In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the Court denied the administration’s claim that the economic crisis justified stretching the ordinary constitutional restraints on federal power. The NIRA, the justices asserted, by giving an executive agency the power to define “fair competition,” unlawfully granted legislative authority to the executive branch. Moreover, the Court dismissed the administration’s contention that this particular business could be regulated by the federal government under the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. Although the chickens might have originally come from outside New York, the Schechters sold them exclusively to butchers within the state, hence it was not part of the “stream of interstate commerce.”
President Roosevelt was outraged by the ruling, which he claimed was based on an antiquated reading of the Constitution. He was particularly disturbed by the fact that even the Supreme Court’s liberals, such as the venerable progressive Justice Louis Brandeis, signed on to the decision. Brandeis told a group of the president’s aides to “go back and tell the president that we’re not going to let this government centralize everything.”
Source: Online from “FDR and the Supreme Court,” The New Deal Network (Columbia University: Institute for Learning Technologies), http://newdeal.feri.org/court/295US495.htm.
First. Two preliminary points are stressed by the government with respect to the appropriate approach to the important questions presented. We are told that the provision of the statute authorizing the adoption of codes must be viewed in the light of the grave national crisis with which Congress was confronted. Undoubtedly, the conditions to which power is addressed are always to be considered when the exercise of power is challenged. Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power. The Constitution established a national government with powers deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to be both in war and peace, but these powers of the national government are limited by the constitutional grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the imposed limits because they believe that more or different power is necessary. Such assertions of extraconstitutional authority were anticipated and precluded by the explicit terms of the Tenth Amendment – ‘The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’
The further point is urged that the national crisis demanded a broad and intensive co-operative effort by those engaged in trade and industry, and that this necessary co-operation was sought to be fostered by permitting them to initiate the adoption of codes. But the statutory plan is not simply one for voluntary effort. It does not seek merely to endow voluntary trade or industrial associations or groups with privileges or immunities. It involves the coercive exercise of the lawmaking power. The codes of fair competition which the statute attempts to authorize are codes of laws. If valid, they place all persons within their reach under the obligation of positive law, binding equally those who assent and those who do not assent. Violations of the provisions of the codes are punishable as crimes.
Second. The Question of the Delegation of Legislative Power. . . . The Constitution provides that ‘All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.’ Article 1, 1. And the Congress is authorized ‘To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution’ its general powers. Article 1, 8, par. 18. The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. We have repeatedly recognized the necessity of adapting legislation to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national Legislature cannot deal directly. . . . But we said that the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained. . . .
Accordingly, we look to the statute to see whether Congress has overstepped these limitations – whether Congress in authorizing ‘codes of fair competition’ has itself established the standards of legal obligation, thus performing its essential legislative function, or, by the failure to enact such standards, has attempted to transfer that function to others. . . .
What is meant by ‘fair competition’ as the term is used in the act? Does it refer to a category established in the law, and is the authority to make codes limited accordingly? Or is it used as a convenient designation for whatever set of laws the formulators of a code for a particular trade or industry may propose and the President may approve (subject to certain restrictions), or the President may himself prescribe, as being wise and beneficent provisions for the government of the trade or industry in order to accomplish the broad purposes of rehabilitation, correction, and expansion which are stated in the first section of title 1?
The act does not define ‘fair competition.’ ‘Unfair competition,’ as known to the common law, is a limited concept. Primarily, and strictly, it relates to the palming off of one’s goods as those of a rival trader. . . . Unfairness in competition has been predicated of acts which lie outside the ordinary course of business and are tainted by fraud or coercion or conduct otherwise prohibited by law. . . . But it is evident that in its widest range, ‘unfair competition,’ as it has been understood in the law, does not reach the objectives of the codes which are authorized by the National Industrial Recovery Act. The codes may, indeed, cover conduct which existing law condemns, but they are not limited to conduct of that sort. The government does not contend that the act contemplates such a limitation. It would be opposed both to the declared purposes of the act and to its administrative construction. . . .
. . . .The government urges that the codes will ‘consist of rules of competition deemed fair for each industry by representative members of that industry – by the persons most vitally concerned and most familiar with its problems.’ Instances are cited in which Congress has availed itself of such assistance; as, e.g., in the exercise of its authority over the public domain, with respect to the recognition of local customs or rules of miners as to mining claims, or, in matters of a more or less technical nature, as in designating the standard height of drawbars. But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises? And could an effort of that sort be made valid by such a preface of generalities as to permissible aims as we find in section 1 of title 1? The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.
The question, then, turns upon the authority which section 3 of the Recovery Act vests in the President to approve or prescribe. If the codes have standing as penal statutes, this must be due to the effect of the executive action. But Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade or industry. . . .
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Section 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry, or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, section 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction, and expansion described in section 1. In view of the scope of that broad declaration and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the code-making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
Third. The Question of the Application of the Provisions of the Live Poultry Code to Intrastate Transactions. . . .
Were these transactions ‘in’ interstate commerce? Much is made of the fact that almost all the poultry coming to New York is sent there from other states. But the code provisions, as here applied, do not concern the transportation of the poultry from other states to New York, or the transactions of the commission men or others to whom it is consigned, or the sales made by such consignees to defendants. When defendants had made their purchases, whether at the West Washington Market in New York City or at the railroad terminals serving the city, or elsewhere, the poultry was trucked to their slaughterhouses in Brooklyn for local disposition. The interstate transactions in relation to that poultry then ended. Defendants held the poultry at their slaughterhouse markets for slaughter and local sale to retail dealers and butchers who in turn sold directly to consumers. Neither the slaughtering nor the sales by defendants were transactions in interstate commerce. . . .
The undisputed facts thus afford no warrant for the argument that the poultry handled by defendants at their slaughterhouse markets was in a ‘current’ or ‘flow’ of interstate commerce, and was thus subject to congressional regulation. The mere fact that there may be a constant flow of commodities into a state does not mean that the flow continues after the property has arrived and has become commingled with the mass of property within the state and is there held solely for local disposition and use. So far as the poultry here in question is concerned, the flow in interstate commerce had ceased. The poultry had come to a permanent rest within the state. It was not held, used, or sold by defendants in relation to any further transactions in interstate commerce and was not destined for transportation to other states. Hence decisions which deal with a stream of interstate commerce – where goods come to rest within a state temporarily and are later to go forward in interstate commerce – and with the regulations of transactions involved in that practical continuity of movement, are not applicable here. . . .
In determining how far the federal government may go in controlling intrastate transactions upon the ground that they ‘affect’ interstate commerce, there is a necessary and well-established distinction between direct and indirect effects. . . . [W]here the effect of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce is merely indirect, such transactions remain within the domain of state power. If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people, and the authority of the state over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of the federal government. Indeed, on such a theory, even the development of the state’s commercial facilities would be subject to federal control. . . .
On both the grounds we have discussed, the attempted delegation of legislative power and the attempted regulation of intrastate transactions which affect interstate commerce only indirectly, we hold the code provisions here in question to be invalid and that the judgment of conviction must be reversed.
A. On what grounds does the Court find the NIRA unconstitutional? What do the justices think of the administration’s claim that the law was justified on the basis of the severity of the economic crisis? On what do they base their conclusion that the poultry code was not legal under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution?
B. Based on your reading of Roosevelt’s Fireside Chat On the Purposes and Foundations of the Recovery Program, why do you think this decision was regarded as such a devastating blow to Roosevelt’s agenda? How does the reasoning in this case compare to that used by the Court in United States v. Butler?