303 Creative LLC v. Elenis

Image: The Roberts Court, April 23, 2021 Seated from left to right: Justices Samuel A. Alito, Jr. and Clarence Thomas, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., and Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor Standing from left to right: Justices Brett M. Kavanaugh, Elena Kagan, Neil M. Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett. Photograph by Fred Schilling, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States
Do you think website design is entitled to First Amendment protection? How were the stipulations relevant to this case? Do you believe that the public accommodations law is an example of compelled speech? How, in Gorsuch’s opinion, have public accommodations laws expanded to encroach upon First Amendment freedoms? Do you agree with the dissenters that the exemption given to Ms. Smith in this case will diminish the dignity and participation in society of protected groups?
What precedents did Justice Gorsuch cite against compelled speech? What is the significance of Masterpiece Cake v. Colorado (2018)? Compare the Court’s expansion of free speech in this case with Reno v. ACLU (1997).
Introduction

Lorie Smith was a custom website designer who held the sincere Christian belief that marriage is between a man and woman. She wanted to expand her business but feared that the Colorado Antidiscrimination Act (CADA) would sanction her for refusing to create websites for same-sex couples, thereby harming her business or forcing her to promote a message with which she conscientiously disagreed. She sought an injunction against the future enforcement of the law before any action was brought against her. Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch extended free speech to “original,” “customized,” and “tailored” design graphics on websites as a new protected form of expression under the First Amendment. He further decided that the public accommodations clause of the Colorado Antidiscrimination Act amounted to compelled speech, which the Court had consistently struck down in the precedents of West Virginia v. Barnette (1943), Hurley v. Irish-American Gay and Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (1995), and Boy Scouts v. Dale (2000). Gorsuch’s decision was based in part on several stipulations made by Smith, including her testimony that she would conduct business with protected classes as long as she was not forced to create expressions that violated her core Christian beliefs. Writing for the dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan and Justice Jackson, argued that Smith’s unwillingness to comply with the public accommodations law constituted action, not speech. The dissent provides a history of discrimination against protected groups, emphasizing the importance of public accommodations law in guaranteeing equal dignity and participation in society. The majority and dissent exchanged spirited barbs throughout their opinions. Mentioned throughout is the prior Colorado case of Masterpiece Cake v. Colorado (2018), which granted a religious and free speech exemption to a baker who refused to create a rainbow cake, a symbol of gay pride, in violation of his conscience.

—Joseph Fornieri


Source: 600 U.S. 570 (2023), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/21-476.


JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.

Like many states, Colorado has a law forbidding businesses from engaging in discrimination when they sell goods and services to the public. Laws along these lines have done much to secure the civil rights of all Americans. But in this particular case Colorado does not just seek to ensure the sale of goods or services on equal terms. It seeks to use its law to compel an individual to create speech she does not believe. The question we face is whether that course violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment....

In her lawsuit, Ms. Smith alleged that, if she enters the wedding website business to celebrate marriages she does endorse, she faces a credible threat that Colorado will seek to use CADA [Colorado Antidiscrimination Act] to compel her to create websites celebrating marriages she does not endorse. As evidence, Ms. Smith pointed to Colorado’s record of past enforcement actions under CADA, including one that worked its way to this Court five years ago.

To facilitate the district court’s resolution of the merits of her case, Ms. Smith and the state stipulated to a number of facts:

• Ms. Smith is “willing to work with all people regardless of classifications such as race, creed, sexual orientation, and gender,” and she “will gladly create custom graphics and websites” for clients of any sexual orientation. She will not produce content that “contradicts biblical truth” regardless of who orders it. Her belief that marriage is a union between one man and one woman is a sincerely held religious conviction.

• All of the graphic and website design services Ms. Smith provides are “expressive.”

• The websites and graphics Ms. Smith designs are “original, customized” creations that “contribut[e] to the overall messages” her business conveys “through the websites” it creates.

• Just like the other services she provides, the wedding websites Ms. Smith plans to create “will be expressive in nature.”

• Those wedding websites will be “customized and tailored” through close collaboration with individual couples, and they will “express Ms. Smith’s and 303 Creative’s message celebrating and promoting” her view of marriage.

• Viewers of Ms. Smith’s websites “will know that the websites are [Ms. Smith’s and 303 Creative’s] original artwork.”


• To the extent Ms. Smith may not be able to provide certain services to a potential customer, “[t]here are numerous companies in the State of Colorado and across the nation that offer custom website design services.”..

The framers designed the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to protect the “freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think.”1 They did so because they saw the freedom of speech “both as an end and as a means.”2 An end because the freedom to think and speak is among our inalienable human rights. A means because the freedom of thought and speech is “indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.”3 By allowing all views to flourish, the framers understood, we may test and improve our own thinking both as individuals and as a nation. For all these reasons, “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,” it is the principle that the government may not interfere with “an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”4

From time to time, governments in this country have sought to test these foundational principles. In Barnette, for example, the Court faced an effort by the state of West Virginia to force schoolchildren to salute the nation’s flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.5 If the students refused, the state threatened to expel them and fine or jail their parents. Some families objected on the ground that the state sought to compel their children to express views at odds with their faith as Jehovah’s Witnesses. When the dispute arrived here, this Court offered a firm response. In seeking to compel students to salute the flag and recite a pledge, the Court held, state authorities had “transcend[ed] constitutional limitations on their powers.” Their dictates “invade[d] the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment ... to reserve from all official control.”

A similar story unfolded in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.6 There, veterans organizing a St. Patrick’s Day parade in Boston refused to include a group of gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals in their event. The group argued that Massachusetts’ public accommodations statute entitled it to participate in the parade as a matter of law. Lower courts agreed. But this Court reversed. Whatever state law may demand, this Court explained, the parade was constitutionally protected speech and requiring the veterans to include voices they wished to exclude would impermissibly require them to “alter the expressive content of their parade.” The veterans’ choice of what to say (and not say) might have been unpopular, but they had a First Amendment right to present their message undiluted by views they did not share.

Then there is Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.7 In that case, the Boy Scouts excluded James Dale, an assistant scoutmaster, from membership after learning he was gay. Mr. Dale argued that New Jersey’s public accommodations law required the Scouts to reinstate him. The New Jersey Supreme Court sided with Mr. Dale, but again this Court reversed. The decision to exclude Mr. Dale may not have implicated pure speech, but this Court held that the Boy Scouts “is an expressive association” entitled to First Amendment protection. And, the Court found, forcing the Scouts to include Mr. Dale would “interfere with [its] choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs.”

As these cases illustrate, the First Amendment protects an individual’s right to speak his mind regardless of whether the government considers his speech sensible and well intentioned or deeply “misguided,” and likely to cause “anguish” or “incalculable grief.”8 Equally, the First Amendment protects acts of expressive association. Generally, too, the government may not compel a person to speak its own preferred messages. Nor does it matter whether the government seeks to compel a person to speak its message when he would prefer to remain silent or to force an individual to include other ideas with his own speech that he would prefer not to include. All that offends the First Amendment just the same.... 

... Under Colorado’s logic, the government may compel anyone who speaks for pay on a given topic to accept all commissions on that same topic—no matter the underlying message—if the topic somehow implicates a customer’s statutorily protected trait. Taken seriously, that principle would allow the government to force all manner of artists, speechwriters, and others whose services involve speech to speak what they do not believe on pain of penalty. The government could require “an unwilling Muslim movie director to make a film with a Zionist message,” or “an atheist muralist to accept a commission celebrating Evangelical zeal,”9 so long as they would make films or murals for other members of the public with different messages. Equally, the government could force a male website designer married to another man to design websites for an organization that advocates against same-sex marriage. Countless other creative professionals, too, could be forced to choose between remaining silent, producing speech that violates their beliefs, or speaking their minds and incurring sanctions for doing so. As our precedents recognize, the First Amendment tolerates none of that.

In saying this much, we do not question the vital role public accommodations laws play in realizing the civil rights of all Americans. This Court has recognized that governments in this country have a “compelling interest” in eliminating discrimination in places of public accommodation. This Court has recognized, too, that public accommodations laws “vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.”10

Over time, governments in this country have expanded public accommodations laws in notable ways too. Statutes like Colorado’s grow from nondiscrimination rules the common law sometimes imposed on common carriers and places of traditional public accommodation like hotels and restaurants. Often, these enterprises exercised something like monopoly power or hosted or transported others or their belongings much like bailees. Over time, some states, Colorado included, have expanded the reach of these nondiscrimination rules to cover virtually every place of business engaged in any sales to the public.... 

... This Court has also recognized that no public accommodations law is immune from the demands of the Constitution. In particular, this Court has held, public accommodations statutes can sweep too broadly when deployed to compel speech. In Hurley, the Court commented favorably on Massachusetts’ public accommodations law, but made plain it could not be “applied to expressive activity” to compel speech. In Dale, the Court observed that New Jersey’s public accommodations law had many lawful applications but held that it could “not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association.” And, once more, what was true in those cases must hold true here. When a state public accommodations law and the Constitution collide, there can be no question which must prevail....

In this case, Colorado seeks to force an individual to speak in ways that align with its views but defy her conscience about a matter of major significance. In the past, other states in Barnette, Hurley, and Dale have similarly tested the First Amendment’s boundaries by seeking to compel speech they thought vital at the time. But, as this Court has long held, the opportunity to think for ourselves and to express those thoughts freely is among our most cherished liberties and part of what keeps our Republic strong. Of course, abiding the Constitution’s commitment to the freedom of speech means all of us will encounter ideas we consider “unattractive,” “misguided, or even hurtful.”11 But, tolerance, not coercion, is our nation’s answer. The First Amendment envision the United States as a rich and complex place where all persons are free to think and speak as they wish, not as the government demands. Because Colorado seeks to deny that promise, the judgment is

Reversed.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting. 

... The legal duty of a business open to the public to serve the public without unjust discrimination is deeply rooted in our history. The true power of this principle, however, lies in its capacity to evolve, as society comes to understand more forms of unjust discrimination and, hence, to include more persons as full and equal members of “the public.”... 

... Crucially, the law “does not dictate the content of speech at all, which is only ‘compelled’ if, and to the extent,” the company offers “such speech” to other customers.12 Colorado does not require the company to “speak [the state’s] preferred message.” Nor does it prohibit the company from speaking the company’s preferred message. The company could, for example, offer only wedding websites with biblical quotations describing marriage as between one man and one woman. (Just as it could offer only t-shirts with such quotations.) The company could also refuse to include the words “Love is Love” if it would not provide those words to any customer. All the company has to do is offer its services without regard to customers’ protected characteristics. Any effort on the company’s speech is therefore “incidental” to the state’s content-neutral regulation of conduct.

Once these features of the law are understood, it becomes clear that petitioners’ freedom of speech is not abridged in any meaningful sense, factual or legal. Petitioners remain free to advocate the idea that same-sex marriage betrays God’s laws. Even if Smith believes God is calling her to do so through her for-profit company, the company need not hold out its goods or services to the public at large. Many filmmakers, visual artists, and writers never do. (That is why the law does not require Steven Spielberg or Banksy to make films or art for anyone who asks.) Finally, and most importantly, even if the company offers its goods or services to the public, it remains free under state law to decide what messages to include or not to include. To repeat (because it escapes the majority): The company can put whatever “harmful” or “low-value” speech it wants on its websites. It can “tell people what they do not want to hear.” All the company may not do is offer wedding websites to the public yet refuse those same websites to gay and lesbian couples.

Another example might help to illustrate the point. A professional photographer is generally free to choose her subjects. She can make a living taking photos of flowers or celebrities. The state does not regulate that choice. If the photographer opens a portrait photography business to the public, however, the business may not deny to any person, because of race, sex, national origin, or other protected characteristic, the full and equal enjoyment of whatever services the business chooses to offer. That is so even though portrait photography services are customized and expressive. If the business offers school photos, it may not deny those services to multiracial children because the owner does not want to create any speech indicating that interracial couples are acceptable. If the business offers corporate headshots, it may not deny those services to women because the owner believes a woman’s place is in the home. And if the business offers passport photos, it may not deny those services to Mexican Americans because the owner opposes immigration from Mexico.


The same is true for sexual-orientation discrimination. If a photographer opens a photo booth outside of city hall and offers to sell newlywed photos captioned with the words “Just Married,” she may not refuse to sell that service to a newlywed gay or lesbian couple, even if she believes the couple is not, in fact, just married because in her view their marriage is “false.”... 

Footnotes
  1. 1. Justice Gorsuch’s note: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660–661 (2000).
  2. 2. Justice Gorsuch’s note: Whitney v California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
  3. 3. Justice Gorsuch’s note: Whitney v California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
  4. 4. Justice Gorsuch’s note: West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014).
  5. 5. West Virginia Board of Educatiton v. Barnette (1943), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/west-virginia-state-board-of-education-v-barnette/.
  6. 6. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. (1995), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-749.
  7. 7. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/boy-scouts-of-america-v-dale/.
  8. 8. Justice Gorsuch’s note: Hurley; Snyder v. Phelps (2011).
  9. 9. Justice Gorsuch quoted from a dissenting opinion in the Colorado court case.
  10. 10. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/atlanta-motel-v-united-states/.
  11. 11. Justice Gorsuch quoted from the dissent and from Hurley.
  12. 12. Justice Sotomayor’s note: FAIR, 547 U. S., at 62.
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