Source: The Pentagon Papers as published by The New York Times (New York and Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 155–8. A photocopy of the original “1961 Rusk-McNamara Report to Kennedy on South Vietnam” is available online at the New York Times Archive for July 1, 1971. https://goo.gl/2ZoxfJ.
1. United States National Interests in South Viet-Nam.
The deteriorating situation in South Viet-Nam requires attention to the nature and scope of United States national interests in that country. The loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would involve the transfer of a nation of 20 million people from the free world to the Communism bloc. The loss of South Viet-Nam would make pointless any further discussion about the importance of Southeast Asia to the free world; we would have to face the near certainty that the remainder of Southeast Asia and Indonesia would move to a complete accommodation with Communism, if not formal incorporation with the Communist bloc. The United States, as a member of SEATO, has commitments with respect to South Viet-Nam under the Protocol to the SEATO Treaty.1 Additionally, in a formal statement at the conclusion session of the 1954 Geneva Conference, the United States representative stated that the United States “would view any renewal of the aggression . . . with grave concern and seriously threatening international peace and security.”
The loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would not only destroy SEATO but would undermine the credibility of American commitments elsewhere. Further, loss of South Viet-Nam would stimulate bitter domestic controversies in the United States and would be seized upon by extreme elements to divide the country and harass the Administration. . . .
. . .
3. The United States’ Objective in South Viet-Nam
The United States should commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to [communism]. The basic means for accomplishing this objective must be to put the Government of South Viet-Nam into a position to win its own war against the Guerrillas.2 We must insist that that Government itself take the measures necessary for that purpose in exchange for large-scale United States assistance in the military, economic and political fields. At the same time we must recognize that it will probably not be possible for the GVN3 to win this war as long as the flow of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam continues unchecked and the guerrillas enjoy a safe sanctuary in neighboring territory.
We should be prepared to introduce United States combat forces if that should become necessary for success. Dependent upon the circumstances, it may also be necessary for United States forces to strike at the source of the aggression in North Viet-Nam. . . .
In the light of the foregoing, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense recommend that:
- We now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism and that, in doing so, we recognize that the introduction of United States and other SEATO forces may be necessary to achieve this objective. (However, if it is necessary to commit outside forces to achieve the foregoing objective our decision to introduce United States forces should not be contingent upon unanimous SEATO agreement thereto.)
- The Department of Defense be prepared with plans for the use of United States forces in South Viet Nam under one or more of the following purposes:
(a) Use of a significant number of United States forces to signify United States determination to defend Viet-Nam and to boost South Viet-Nam morale.
(b) Use of substantial United States forces to assist in suppressing Viet Cong insurgency short of engaging in detailed counter-guerrilla operations but including relevant operations in North Viet-Nam.
(c) Use of United States forces to deal with the situation if there is organized Communist military intervention. . . .
