Thomas Jefferson first heard of the depredations of the Barbary pirates of North Africa while serving as the American minister to the Court of Versailles in 1784–89. He referred to the Barbary powers as “these nests of banditti” and as early as November 1784 expressed the desire to “cut them to pieces by piecemeal.” The four Barbary States—Algiers, Morocco, Tripoli, and Tunis—extorted “tribute” from western powers in exchange for safe passage of commercial vessels in Mediterranean waters. Most European powers paid this tribute as the price of doing business, and on occasion even bribed the pirates to attack their rivals. The United States was forced to pay tribute as well. During the 1790s that tribute began to approach 10 percent of the federal budget.
Jefferson’s elevation to the American presidency in 1801 gave him the opportunity to strike back at the states harassing American shipping in the Mediterranean. Despite his long-standing disdain for the Barbary States, however, Jefferson initially responded to their hostility with a mix of conciliatory gestures (including payments) and a show of force. On May 14, 1801, just over two months into Jefferson’s presidency, the King of Tripoli chopped down the American flagpole at the American consulate, signaling war between the two nations.
President Jefferson held his first cabinet meeting the next day and raised the issue of sending U.S. Navy ships to the Mediterranean to confront Tripoli. Jefferson and his cabinet concluded that it was within the president’s constitutional rights to do so, and the administration issued orders to the commander of the American flotilla to be extremely aggressive in pursuing pirate vessels. The instructions read in part, “chastise their insolence—by sinking, burning or destroying their ships & vessels wherever you shall find them.” Jefferson would later congratulate the commander of the USS Enterprise for punishing “those barbarians” who for too long “trample[d] … on the rights & laws of human nature.”
Jefferson misled Congress in this account of events in the Mediterranean by claiming that the U.S. Navy maintained a defensive posture and engaged in hostilities only in case of an attack on an American ship. This restraint was due to the absence of any congressional authorization for the use of force, the president observed. Jefferson would not be the last American president to offer a less than candid account of events leading to hostilities, as we will see with James K. Polk (Document 28). Jefferson was determined to leave a legacy of executive restraint in keeping with his strict construction of the Constitution, however, and thus he offered a less than accurate account of American actions in the Mediterranean. Misleading accounts such as this one and those of Jefferson’s successors would erode Congress’ constitutionally mandated authority over war and foreign affairs.
An interesting side note regarding this message: Jefferson had his secretary, Meriwether Lewis (1774–1809), who with William Clark later led the Corps of Discovery to the Pacific coast, deliver written copies to Congress, breaking with the practice of delivering an annual message in person that began with George Washington. Jefferson’s precedent held until 1913 when Woodrow Wilson renewed the practice of addressing Congress in person.